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THE PREDICATES OF SUSPICION: STOP AND
FRISK ON AN INFORMANT'S TIP
EXTENDING TERRY TO
POSSESSORY OFFENSES
INTRODUCTION
The law of search and seizure has seen a rapid expansion in
all levels of government with a definite concentration in the area
of police practices and procedures. In reacting to the realities of
law enforcement efforts on the one hand, while respecting individual rights on the other, the United States Supreme Court has oftentimes strained to maintain a workable balance between the governing and the governed.
In attempting to keep the Constitution current, various applications of the Fourth Amendment have given rise to pronouncements
of acceptable police practices. In Terry v. Ohio,1 the Supreme
Court put its imprimatur on a practice nowhere defined or alluded
to within the provisions of the Fourth Amendment. As a hybrid
of search and seizure, Terry recognized for the first time the antecedent procedure of stop-and-frisk.
It would serve no useful purpose to repeat what has already
been said in the numerous articles and commentaries on Terry
and the law of stop and frisk; 2 a cursory review would at once
illuminate the differing opinions on the subject. Instead, the primary purpose of this note is to address narrowly the most recent
milestone concerning stop and frisk practices.
Recognizing that Terry approved a stop based upon suspicious
circumstances observed by a skilled officer and subsequent frisk
where the suspect was perceived as dangerous, the recent Supreme
Court case of Adams v. Williams3 has gone a step beyond. A stopand-frisk may now proceed upon an informant's tip, and the circumstances investigated need only be possessory in nature.
The Adams decision has given rise to vague standards of
Fourth Amendment interpretation especially in light of the fact
that Terry was an exception to common search and seizure requirements. Consequently an attempt will be made here to focus on possible limitations, with special emphasis on recent developments.
To achieve this end a brief history will be sketched before a close
analysis of suspicious circumstances justifying a stop is presented.
1. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" And The
And Beyond, 67 MIcn. L. REV. 40 rm4 (1969).
3. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).

Constitutivn: Terry, Sibron, Peters,
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Consideration will be given to those circumstances observed by
the confronting police officer, and those related to him by an informant. Finally, a brief discourse on contemporary thoughts on
stop-and-frisk will be supplemented with a look at the possible ramifications of Adams v. Williams.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS OF STOP AND FRISK:
FROM TERRY TO ADAMS
When the Supreme Court handed down the opinion of Terry v.
Ohio' in 1968, constitutional substance was given to the popular
police practice of stop-and-frisk. In recognizing this pre-arrest
procedure for the first time, an attempt was made to establish reasonable guidelines commensurate with Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. The lines drawn,
however, were necessarily vague inasmuch as this procedure, occurring prior to a formal arrest, is often initiated on less than
probable cause.6
In Terry, a police officer of considerable experience observed
the defendant and his companions walking up and down the street,
occasionally 'engaging in conversation with each other. From the
totality of the circumstances, the officer suspected that the defendants were casing a store for a hold-up.
In an attempt to discover their intentions, the officer confronted
Terry and after several unsatisfactory answers to his questions, a
quick frisk ensued. When a hard object was felt on the initial "pat
down" of the outer clothing, the officer reached inside Terry's jacket and retrieved a revolver. This gave rise to probable cause to
arrest on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon leading to a
further search and seizure of Terry.
In upholding the actions of the officer, the Court discussed the
close distinctions between a stop or seizure and an arrest in relation to a frisk and search., If the stop is involuntary, the suspect
is seized but not arrested until (indeed if at all) the circumstances
give rise to probable cause. Conversely, if the stop is voluntary
4. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5. The Court was cognizant of the dangers in sanctioning such pre-arrest practices
when It said:
We thus decide nothing today concerning the constitutional propriety of
an Investigative "seizure" upon less than probable cause for purposes of
"detention" and/or interrogation.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968).
6. When the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has
in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen we may conclude that a
"seizure" has occurred.
Id. The Court felt that on the facts presented, there existed a search and seizure:
In this case there can be no question, then, that Officer McFadden "seized"
petitioner and subjected him to a "search" when he took hold of him and
patted down the outer surfaces of his clothing.
Id. at 19.
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there exists neither an arrest nor seizure if the individual confronted
is free to go at will.
However, Terry's holding was limited only to the frisk question:
The crux of this case . . . is not the propriety of Officer

McFadden's taking steps to investigate petitioner's suspicious behavior, but rather, whether there was justification
for McFadden's invasion of Terry's personal security by
searching him for weapons in the course of that investigation.1
The Court did not speculate as to what circumstances might justify
the initial confrontation, but the reasonableness of the officer's suspicion apparently received judicial approval.8
With the basic tenets of stop-and-frisk thus established, further
definitive characteristics were announced in the companion cases
of Sibron v. New York 9 and Peters v. New York. 10 In Sibron,
7. Id. at 23.
8. In a concurring opinion, Justice Harlan felt that the validity of the initial
stop must be valid before a proper frisk commences:
[I]f the frisk is Justified in order to protect the officer during an encounter with a citizen, the officer must first have constitutional grounds
to Insist on the encounter, to make a forcible stop. Any person, including
a policeman, is at liberty to avoid a person he considers dangerous. If and
when a policeman has a right instead to disarm such a person for his own
protection, he must first have a right not to avoid him but to be in his
presence. That right must be more than the liberty (again, possessed by
every citizen) to address questions to other persons, for ordinarily the person
addressed has an equal right to ignore his interrogator and walk away; he
certainly need not submit to a frisk for the questioner's protection. I would
make it perfectly clear that the right to frisk in this case depends upon the
reasonableness of a forcible stop to investigate a suspected crime.
Id. at 32-33.
9. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968).
10. Peters v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). Both Sibron and Peters were convicted
under authority of New York's stop-and-frisk law which provides:
1. A police officer may stop any person abroad in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a
felony or any of the offenses specified in section five hundred fifty-two of
of this chapter, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
2. When a police officer has stopped a person for questioning pursuant to this
section and reasonably suspects that he is in danger of life or limb, he
may search such person for a dangerous weapon. If the police officer finds
such a weapon or any other thing the possession of which may constitute a
crime, he may take and keep it until the completion of the questioning, at
which time he shall either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such
person.
N.Y. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 180-a (1968). This statute has now been amended to read:
Temporary questioning of persons in public places; search for weapons.
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an arrest
without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person In a public place located within the geographical area of such officer's employment when he
reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed or is
about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a class A misdemeanor defined
In the penal law, and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct.
2. A court officer of the criminal courts of this state may stop a person in or
about the courtroom to which he is assigned when he reasonably suspects
that such person is committing, has committed or is about to commit either
(a) a felony or (b) a class A misdemeanor defined In the penal law, and
may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his conduct.
3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed In subdivisions
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Officer Martin observed the defendant talking with several known
narcotic addicts at various times during the evening in a high
crime area of New York. After observing Sibron for some time in
a restaurant, Martin approached and asked him to come outside.
Without ever hearing the nature of the conversations between Sibron and the alleged addicts, Martin, once outside, told the defendant: "You know what I am after."1 1 Sibron put his hand in his
pocket whereupon the officer immediately reached therein retrieving an envelope containing heroin.
In determining that the stop-and-frisk was unjustified the Court
found that Officer Martin's observations of Sibron talking to others
did not establish probable cause, nor were the circumstances sufficient to precipitate a stop. The opinion discussed the reasonableness 12 of the observations pursuant to Fourth Amendment standards:
The inference that persons who talk to narcotics addicts
are engaged in the criminal traffic in narcotics is simply
not the sort of reasonable inference required to support an
intrusion by the police upon an individual's personal secuity. Nothing resembling probable cause existed until after
the search had turned up the envelopes of heroin. It is axiomatic that an incident search may not precede an arrest
and serve as part of its justification."3
This reasoning was directed primarily at the state's ex post
facto argument which tried to justify the stop and frisk by the evidence obtained. The ends were not allowed to justify the means
however, for all antecedent police procedures are required to be
constitutionally correct from the outset. Cognizance was nevertheless given to the fact that Officer Martin's seizure and search may
still have been justified, even without probable cause, if there 'had
been reasonable grounds to believe that Sibron was armed and
one and two a police officer or court officer, as the case may be, reasonably
suspects that he Is in danger of physical injury, he may search such person
for a deadly weapon or any instrument, article or substance readily capable
of causing serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in
public places by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument, or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes
may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep it until
the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return it,
If lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
N.Y. CoD CaIM. Psoc. § 140.50 (McKinney's Supp. 1973). See notes 169, 177 infra and
accompanying text.
11. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 64 (1968).
12. It will become apparent as the reader progresses through this note that the
very narrow interpretation of any factual situation in light of the Fourth Amendment
always involves a determination of reasonableness or unreasonableness. The courts however, seem to take the long route to reach their objective, with much of what is said
constituting dicta. See, e.g., Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971) ; Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) ; LaFave, supra note 2, at 86.
13. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-63 (1968). See also Henry v. United States,
361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948).

NOTES

dangerous.14 This factor not being present in Sibron, the search
was found to violate the standards of the Fourth Amendment "which
protects the sanctity of the person against unreasonable intrusions
on the part of all government agents." 15
In determining the reasonableness of the stop and frisk, apparent deference was given to the circumstances in which the officer
conducted his observations. Since suspicion of narcotics is only possessory in nature, the situation did not call for immediate action
on the part of the officer. A more direct approach was taken by
the Sibron Court in discussing the validity of the stop. Finding the
stop unconstitutional; the heroin discovered during the subsequent
search was held not to be admissible in evidence.
In Peters, Officer Lasky heard a loud noise outside his apartment and observed the defendant tiptoeing down the hallway. After
calling the police, Lasky slammed the door of his apartment, and
when the defendant fled, the officer pursued him. Peters was
caught as he was running down the stairs, and an immediate frisk
for weapons revealed a hard object in his pocket. Lasky removed
the object, thinking it to be a knife, but discovered that it was
in fact burglar tools.
The Court found that the search of Peters was reasonable
as incident to a lawful arrest. It was also noted that Officer
Lasky, once he had stopped Peters, could reasonably suspect that
he was in danger of life or limb. 8 The personal observation by
the officer, coupled with the flight of the defendant gave rise to
stronger circumstantial evidence to justify a stop and frisk than
existed in Sibron.
Since the decisions in Terry, Sibron and Peters, the Supreme
Court has remained relatively silent on the topic of stop and frisk,
leaving the evolution of the doctrine to lower state and federal
courts.17 It should be noted, however, that the extension of Terry
in Adams v. Williams' was not necessarily unexpected, even
though stop and frisk principles already involved a watering down
of search and seizure probable cause requirements. Indeed, a care14.
Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968). The defining criteria on which it
may be determined that the one confronted Is dangerous, thereby justifying the attendant
frisk, was established when the Court said:
In the case of the self-protective search for weapons, [the officer] must
be able to point to particular facts from which he reasonably Inferred that
the individual was armed and dangerous.
Id. at 64.
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id. at 66.
17. The Interpretation of Terry, Sibron, and Peters has not always been uniform.
For a sampling of cases at the state level conflicting in their interpretation of stopand-frisk principles see Comment, Stop and Frisk: The Issue Unresolved, 49 J.U. LAW
733, 761 n.125 (1972).
18. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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ful reading of cases following Terry reveals a tendency by the
Supreme Court to remain fairly flexible in their interpretation of

.the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement.
5
The case of Davis v. Mississippi"
is indicative of the Court's
liberal approach to police investigatory procedures. In Davis the

defendant was suspected of rape, although the police could not accumulate enough evidence to establish probable cause for an arrest. Davis was brought in for questioning several times, shown to
the victim, and detained overnight twice for fingerprinting. In the

latter instances, the police approached Davis at his home without
probable cause and forcibly took him into custody. Davis was con-

victed when the FBI reports matching his finger prints with those
on the victims' windowsill were admitted into evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed Davis' conviction rejecting the
state's argument distinguishing fingerprints obtained during detention from statements so received. The fingerprints were found to
be inadmissible in evidence 20 because of the blatant violation of
Fourth Amendment safeguards during the investigatory stages of
the defendant's apprehension. 2' However, notwithstanding its ultimate holding, the Court indicated that there was a possibility of
extending Terry22 when it said in dicta:
[B]ecause of the unique nature of the fingerprinting process,
such detentions might, under narrowly defined circumstances,
be found to comply with the Fourth Amendment even 2though
8
there is no probable cause in the traditional sense.
19.
20.

Davis v. Mississippi, 894 U.S. 721 (1969).
Our decisions recognized no exception to the rule that illegally seized
evidence is inadmissible at trial, however relevant and trustworthy the
seized evidence may be as an Item of proof. The exclusionary rule was
fashioned as a sanction to redress and deter overreaching governmental conduct prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. To make an exception for illegally
seized evidence which is trustworthy would fatally undermine these purposes.
Id. at 724.
21.
[T]o argue that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the investigatory
stage Is fundamentally to misconceive the purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Investigatory seizures would subject unlimited numbers of innocent
persons to the harrassment and ignominy Incident to involuntary detention.
Nothing is more clear than that the Fourth Amendment was meant to prevent wholesale Intrusions upon the personal security of our citizenry, whether
these Intrusions be termed "arrests" or "Investigatory detentions."
Id. at 726-27 (footnotes omitted).
22.
[I]n TerrVj v. Ohio . . . we rejected the notions that the Fourth Amendment
does not come Into play at all as a limitation upon police conduct If the
officers stop short of something called a "technical arrest" or a "fullblown search."
Id. at 727.
23. Id. at 727. The Court discussed the following reasons as substantiating the
narrowly defined circumstances on which detention for fingerprinting on less than probable
cause may proceed:
Detention for fingerprinting may constitute a much less serious intrusion
upon personal security than other types of police searches and detentions.
Fingerprinting involves none of the probing Into an Individual's private life
and thoughts that marks an Interrogation or search. Nor can fingerprint
detention be employed repeatedly to harass any Individual, since the police
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With this in mind, Davis seemed to suggest another phase of
stop and frisk which might be commensurate with valid Fourth
Amendment interpretation. While Terry allowed a stopping for investigatory purposes and frisking for protection, the dicta in Davis,
if effected,24 would have extended the stop to an actual detention
for fingerprinting on the grounds of investigatory necessity.
After this early indication of the Court's willingness to remain
somewhat flexible under the newly recognized doctrine of stop and
frisk, there was brief acquiescence with Terry's interpretation of
Fourth Amendment guidelines in Wyman v. James.25 Wyman did
not involve a criminal investigation, but rather questioned the validity of a case worker's search of a welfare recipient's home. In
allowing the search the Court acted with obvious deference to Terry
saying "it [the search] does not descend to the level of unreasonableness. It is unreasonableness which is the Fourth Amendment's
standard, ' ' 26 while "the specific content and incidents of this right
must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted. 1 7 With this
brief reaffirmation of Terry's standards, the Supreme Court has
announced its willingness to apply Fourth Amendment reasonableness criterion to the facts of the case before it. This in turn is put
in juxtaposition with the right claimed to have been violated,
and the resulting solution is weighted in favor of the practical consequences.
In any case, it was not until Adams v. Williams25 that the Supreme Court had an "opportunity to give some flesh to the bones
of Terry et al." ' 29 In the interim there have been various cases
discussing sundry particulars of Terry, with the largest concentration centering on issues related to search and seizure. 0 The develneed only one set of each person's prints. Furthermore, fingerprinting is
an inherently more reliable and effective crime solving tool than eyewitness
identification or confessions and is not subject to such abuses as the improper line-up and "third degree." Finally, because there is no danger of
destruction of fingerprints, the limited detention need not come unexpectedly
or at an inconvenient time.
Id. at 727.
24. The Court qualified its dicta in note 23 supra and accompanying text when it said:
We have no occasion In this case, however, to determine whether the requirements of the Fourth Amendment could be met by narrowly circumscribed procedures for obtaining, during the course of a criminal investigation, the fingerprints of individuals for whom there is no probable cause
to arrest.
Id. at 728.
25. Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971).
26. Id. at 318. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968).
27- Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 318 (1971).
28. Adams V. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
29. Id. at 153-54.
30. For a cursory analysis of cases concerned more directly with search and seizure
issues, and only peripherally relevant as to stop-and-frisk, see Chimel v. California, 395
U.S. 752 (1969); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965)
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Rugendorf v. United
States, 376 U.S. 528 (1964) Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960); Giordenello v.
United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958). See also text accompanying notes 107-120 infra.
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opment has been somewhat equivocal in the sense that courts have
been addressing themselves to the propriety of the frisk as a
search, giving only circumspective attention to the facts precipitating the stop.
The courts have not made clear what facts are necessary to
justify the initial intrusion. Some writers have suggested that the
magnitude of the situation as perceived by the officer may be the
guiding criteria which validates a stop.3 ' However, with the decision in Adams the Supreme Court has shown that the pending
crime need not be inherently dangerous, and the suspicion of the
officer may be premised upon information relayed to him through
an informant.
THE EXTENSION OF TERRY
In Adams v. Williams ' 2 a police officer was informed that the
defendant, Robert Williams, was sitting in a car across the street
and had in his possession a gun and heroin. The informant told
Officer Connolly that the gun was tucked into Williams' belt at the
waist. Acting solely on this information and without actually observing the defendant doing anything particularly suspicious, the
officer approached the car. He asked Williams to open the door,
and when the latter rolled down the window instead, Connolly immediately reached through the window and pulled a gun from the
defendant's waist. Williams was then arrested for unlawful possession of the gun, and a search incident to that arrest revealed substantial quantities of heroin on the defendant's person and in the
car. In finding the "frisk" of Williams by Connolly commensurate
with the standards established in Terry, the heroin was held to be
33
admissible in evidence and the conviction was sustained.
In allowing Officer Connolly's stop and frisk the Court held
that the tip supplied by the informant "carried enough indicia of
reliability to justify the officer's forcible stop of Williams. 3 84
31. See LaFave, supra note 2, at 65.
32. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
33. After conviction at the state level, Williams' appeal to the United States Supreme
Court was denied, State v. Williams, 157 Conn. 114, 249 A.2d 245 (1968), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 927 (1969), and a subsequent petition for habeas corpus relief failed. Williams
v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1970). One year later a rehearing en bane was ordered,
and Williams' conviction was reversed. Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971).
In reversing its first decision, the court said:
Upon reconsideration, we conclude that on the basis of the facts then
known to him, Sergeant Connolly had neither probable cause to arrest Williams nor any other sufficient cause for reaching into Williams [sic] waisteband, an action which led to the subsequent search of Williams [sic] car
and the discovery of a machete and narcotics later introduced In evidence
at Williams' trial. . . . Since those illegally seized items should have been
excluded from evidence, Williams' conviction must be set aside.
Id. at 394.
34. Adams v. Williams, 407 U ,, 1.43, 147 (1972).

NOTES

This reasoning allowed the Court to employ the precedent of Terry
inasmuch as the stop, once justified, may precipitate the necessity of a limited search for weapons.3 5 The frisk subsequent to a
valid stop, is to be limited for protective purposes only.36 However,
as the Adams Court pointed out:
Under the circumstances surrounding Williams' possession of the gun seized by Sgt. Connolly, the arrest on the
weapons charge was supported by probable cause, and the
search of his
person and of the car incident to that arrest
37
was lawful.
The ultimate effect of the Adams decision is to extend the stop
and frisk doctrine as initially defined in Terry, where the confronting officer observed the suspicious behavior which led to the
stop and subsequent frisk, to "possessory" offenses where the criminal activity is not necessarily inherently dangerous. Moreover,
the information leading to the stop was supplied by a police informant, with the confronting officer not actually observing anything
particularly suspicious.
An argument may be raised that Adams is not necessarily an
extension of Terry as much as it is a further clarification of stop
and frisk practices. Although the facts in Terry involved the observations of a police officer, a stop on an informant's tip is not
necessarily precluded. However, in applying the rational of Terry
to the circumstance existing in Adams, the latter approach is of
dubious certainty when it is recognized that Connecticut has a statute allowing individuals to carry concealed weapons if they have
a permit.38 Without more, the informant's tip (not being antecededently verifiable) did not actually reveal whether Williams did, or
did not have a permit for a weapon. Further, the information supplied was prior to any substantial observation by the officer, and
he proceeded to stop, frisk, and arrest without initially acquiring
the necessary predicates for probable cause. 9
In establishing the validity of Officer Connolly's stop and frisk
on the informant's tip, and attempting to reconcile the extension of
Terry with Fourth Amendment safeguards, the Court found that
the Officer was entitled to react to the totality of the situation as
35. Id. at 146. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
36. Id.
37. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972). Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132 (1925) ; Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
38. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-35, 29-38 (1958).
39. See generally Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968) ; Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) ; Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
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he perceived it.40 The early hour of the morning, coupled with
the high crime environment in which the officer worked, led the
Court to believe that there was "ample reason to fear for his
safety ' 41 when he approached Williams in the car. Also, the fact
that the gun was precisely where the informant said it would be
led the Court to conclude that:
This tended to corroborate the reliability of the informant's
further report of narcotics and, together with the surrounding circumstances, certainly suggested
no lawful explana42
tion for possession of the gun.
This reasoning, however, seems to lose substance when it is
considered that the "corroboration" occurred after the stop and
frisk. There was nothing existing within the officer's immediate
knowledge upon which he was reacting, but rather total reliance
was placed on information supplied by another.
If Terry is used as a guideline, the Adams majority's ex post
facto reasoning would not appear to be well founded. In the former,
the constitutional predicate upon which the officer initiated his investigatory stop and protective frisk was plainly found to arise
where observation by the officer himself or well authenticated information shows "that criminal activity may be afoot. ' 43 If the information supplied is not authenticated until after the frisk, the initial intrusion cannot logically be premised upon Terry standards.
The reliability and trustworthiness of the informant was not demonstrated until the gun was in fact found, with the stop ensuing on unsubstantiated hearsay.
If, for example, Williams was unarmed, the officer would be
left with the explanation that "someone told me you were carrying
a gun." The dilemma would arise that even though the stop and
frisk revealed that he was not carrying a gun, the informant had
also stated that defendant had narcotics. On the reasoning above,
could the officer quickly search for heroin, and if found, justify
the antecedent stop? Probably not, but this sophistry cannot be
satisfactorily dismissed in light of Adams.
40.

The opinion addressed itself to the issue of probable cause with seemingly liberal

standards which became at once susceptible to vicarious application in
and-frisk when the Court said:

the area of stop-

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies,
we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and
practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent
men, not legal technicians, act.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972), quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 175 (1949).
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972).
41.

42.
43.

Id. at 148-49.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,

30 (1968).

NOTES

If the stop is to be for investigatory purposes only, with the
frisk ensuing as a precautionary measure, 4 the Adams Court appears to have glossed over the issue of probable cause in this area
of arrest and search and seizure. In finding the stop valid because
the officer pulled a gun from Williams' waistband, "[t]here is too
much danger that, instead of the stop being the object and the protective frisk an incident thereto, the reverse will be true. 4 5 This
approach ought not be taken lightly, especially when it is recognized "that a stop and frisk is a search and seizure within the mean'46
ing of the Fourth Amendment.
Even though it would appear that the distinction between a stop
and frisk and search and seizure is one of degree and not of kind,
a subsequent search should not be allowed to validate the antecedent stop. This difference wag narrowly drawn in Terry with an
attempt to balance Fourth Amendment safeguards with the realities
of on-the-street police encounters. 47 The basic stop and frisk
notion was to afford a certain amount of flexibility under the warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment in order to adequately cope with the pressing exigencies of the moment. 4
This approach however, is not easily reconciled under the Adams rationale, and a closer look at each stage of the pre-arrest procedure
may afford some clarity in this very vague area of stop and frisk.
1.

The Stop

A police officer may have a number of reasons to stop a person
on the street, e.g., to obtain information or to question a suspect.
In such instances the encounter may be either voluntary or involuntary. If voluntary, the officer may question the individual whether or not there is any real reason therefore, as long as it is understood that the person confronted is free to leave when he wishes.
However, if the stop is involuntary the guidelines of Terry become
44. See generally Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968).
45. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 151 (1972)
(Brenan, J., dissenting quoting
Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30, 38 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., dissenting).
46. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 157 n.2 (1972). See also Terry v .Ohio, 392 U.S.
1 (1968).
4,7. Mr. Justice Marshall illustrated this point in his dissenting opinion in Adams
when he said:
In today's decision the Court Ignores the fact that Terr, begrudgingly
accepted the necessity for creating an exception from the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment and treats this case as if warrantless
searches were the rule rather than the "narrowly drawn" exception. This
decision betrays the careful balance that Terry sought to strike between a
citizen's right to privacy and his government's responsibilities for effective
law enforcement and expands the concept of warrantless searches far beyond anything heretofore recognized as legitimate.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1972).
48. Id.
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applicable. Because a stop approaches a seizure4 9 the officer must
have some reason to detain the suspect. Even though the strict requirements of probable cause need not be present, the officer
must determine whether the facts available "at the moment of the
seizure or the search [would] 'warrant a man of reasonable cau-

tion in the belief' that the action taken was appropriate." 50
The appropriateness of the action is further restricted to situations where the "officer observes unusual conduct which leads
him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal
activity may be afoot." 51 The reasonableness of the action is again measured by the specific and articulable facts5 2 to which the
officer can point as the basis of his suspicion.
Consequently, under a strict reading of Terry an officer must
have observed the suspicious activity personally. If, through the intuition of his prior law enforcement expertise, he can reasonably infer that criminal activity may be afoot, then it would appear that
he may proceed to stop the suspect involuntarily.5 3 This reasonableness test is the crux of the Fourth Amendent requirement which
the stop must meet, and constitutes the premise upon which Adams
extended the stop criteria of Terry .

4

The extension in Adams becomes manifest with the realization
that Officer Connolly had not observed the defendant engaging in
criminal activity. A strict application of Terry would negate any
circumstantial suspicion by which the officer could justify the initial confrontation or stop of Williams. 55 Also, the suspicion of the
officer was based entirely on information supplied by an informant, 56

the validity of which would not seem constitutionally adequate un49. "[W]henever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has 'seized' that person." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968).
50. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
51. Id. at 30.
52. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 63 (1968).
53. See generally LaFave, supra note 2.
54. See note 12 supra.
55. The stop by Officer Connolly was not argued to be voluntary on the part of defendant Williams. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 n.1 (1972). Had Williams consented to the stop, the officer may have proceeded with this initial confrontation as
long as It was understood that the defendant was free to go. See note 8 supra.
56. In commenting on the nature of the Information supplied and the obvious stop
thereof, It was emphasized In Mr. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Adams that:
I would not find the combination of Officer Connolly's almost meaningless
observation and the tip in this case to be sufficient Justification for the
intrusion. The tip suffered from a threefold defect, with each fold compounding the others. The informer was unnamed, he was not shown to have
been reliable with respect to guns or narcotics, and he gave no information which demonstrated personal knowledge or-what Is worse--could not
readily have been manufactured by the officer after the event. To my mind,
It has not been sufficiently recognized that the difference between this sort
of tip and the accurate prediction of an unusual event is as important on
the latter score as on the former.
Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 152 (1972), quoting Williams v. Adams, 436 F.2d 30,
(Friendly, J., dissenting).
38 (1971)
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der existing requirements for an arrest and search.5 7 The objective
test of Terry5s does indeed appear to have been stretched exceed-

ingly close to the outer limits of Fourth Amendment reasonableness
standards.5 9
2.

The Frisk

Once the officer has stopped the suspect for investigatory reasons, he may conduct a narrowly limited weapons search for protection. Terry established an objective test which, if answered in

the affirmative, would qualify under the Fourth Amendment. The
determinative question to be answered is:
[W]hether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances
would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that
of others was in danger. 60
This test, however, becomes operative only if the initial stop
was justified. If so, then in order to precipitate a frisk the suspect
must be perceived to be presently dangerous. Conversely, if the
confrontation was not justified, a subsequent frisk would be violative of Fourth Amendment standards and evidence found pursuant
to this frisk would be excludible as the fruit of an unreasonable
search and seizure. Such procedure is of utmost importance and the
fact that the frisk reveals contraband of sorts61 is not significant
under prior Supreme Court decisions. The focus of attention is on
the antecedent police encounter which led to the frisk, measured
against the conduct of the suspect in deciding whether the stop and
frisk was reasonable under existing conditions.
An individual must assume a considerable burden in asserting
his constitutional protection against a search and seizure where
there is no antecedent supporting probable cause. Even though a
57. In order for probable cause to arise from information supplied by an informant
it is generally required that he be proven trustworthy and that he has obtained his information in a reliable way. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 417 (1969).
The Supreme Court "has squarely held that a search and seizure cannot be justified on the basis of conclusory allegations of an unnamed informant who is allegedly
credible." Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 157 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. In Terry the objective standard to be met in permitting an officer to stop an
individual would be satisfied if the following question could be answered affirmatively:
[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure
or the search "warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief" that
the action taken was appropriate?
Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
59. "[Wjhat the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (emphasis added).
60. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
61. E.g., In Terry, defendant was found to be unlawfully possessing a gun, and in
Adams the defendant was not only carrying a gun, but had on his person and in the
car a quantity of heroin. See text accompanying note 45 supra wherein it is discussed
that the frisk and search and seizure should not be allowed to justify the initial stop.
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frisk is to be a limited weapons search,6 2 anything discovered during the course of the "pat down" may be admissible in evidence. 83
Consequently, a packet retrieved under suspicion that it is a dangerous weapon which in fact turns out to contain marijuana or herion, may be used in the prosecution of the possessor thereof.' This
would appear to be a search and seizure on less than probable
cause. The courts, however, have consistently denied this contention 5 without recognizing the obvious consequences proceeding
from the stop and frisk.6 6 It is therefore quite important that the initial intrusion be justified, inasmuch as a frisk is its natural concomitant. A frisk is founded on a valid stop, and it is into this latter
area that Adams ventured while Terry did not.67
The guidelines for a valid stop are now both vague and liberal.
Adams has extended considerably the law of search and seizure by
approving a stop based on an informant's tip. In an effort to narrow the constitutionally acceptable practices of such stops, a close
examination will be given to varying circumstances justifying suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot.
TOWARD

MORE DEFINITE STANDARDS:
OF SUSPICION

THE PREDICATES

With the development of the standards of stop and frisk from
Terry to Adams, the essence of the constitutional question centers
on the initial purpose for which the officer approaches an individual on the street when there is less than probable cause for an
arrest. The approved predicate is the suspicious circumstances
which may be brought to the officer's attention either through personal observation6 8 or upon information relayed to him by an informant.6 9 It would seem easier to justify a stop on mere suspicion
when the officer observed those acts which aroused his curiosity,
as opposed to proceeding merely on an informant's tip which may
or may not prove to be true. However, notwithstanding that possi62. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968).
63. This was dramatically illustrated in People v. Atmore, 13 Cal. App. 3d 244,
91 Cal. Rptr. 311 (1970). Responding to a murder call broadcast over the police radio,
Officer Carrillo stopped defendant because he reasonably matched the description
given. The officer conducted a cursory weapons search (frisk) when he felt a cylindrical object which he thought was a shotgun shell. The object was removed, and at the
same time a marijuana cigarette was found. What was thought to be a shot gun shell
was In fact a lipstick container.
Although defendant was not the suspect sought in the murder incident, he was convicted for the unlawful possession of marijuana-an offense entirely unrelated to the
purposes of the stop.
64. Id.
65. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). See note 5 supra.
66. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1972). See note 47 supra.
67. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). See text accompanying note 7 aupra.
68. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
69. E.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
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bility, courts are increasingly disposed to uphold the information
given as an adequate premise to stop an individual if the informant
is proven to be reliable.
The following discussion will examine possible limitations on
the grounds for suspicion, giving special attention to recent case law.
1. Suspicion Based on Observation
In properly initiating an involuntary stop, it should be recognized at the outset that since probable cause may ultimately be
established during the course of interrogation, 70 careful scrutiny
must be given to the constitutionality of such procedures. It is difficult to establish sound rules in this area, but an officer should
have some purpose in mind before he engages in an investigatory
stop. This purpose in turn should be based on observations revealing circumstances which call for immediate attention.
If an officer can justify his intrusion on reasonable suspicion,
then it follows that the subsequent police procedures leading to a
possible search and seizure will be proper under Fourth Amendment
standards. For example, when a person is stopped on less than probable cause and a gun is found while the officer conducts a frisk,
an arrest may ensue for unlawful possession of that weapon. The
probable cause for the arrest will be the possession itself, and a full
search and seizure may be conducted pursuant to that arrest.
What had started out to be a stop for an investigatory purpose
and a limited weapons search, can proceed to a full search and
seizure resulting from an attendant arrest. With this in mind it
should be obvious that constitutional prerequisites must be met in
the initial phases of the stop so as not to give unlimited discretion
to the confronting police officer. Though cases dealing with stop procedures have been relatively scarce at the Supreme Court level, the
development of stop and frisk practices has seen considerable expansion in the decisions of the Federal Circuit and District Courts.
Generally speaking, circumstances which are sufficiently suspicious to justify an initial stop may be approached in a three step
sequence. Although the courts do not expressly apply any particular
formula in analyzing a valid stop, the factual settings are more
easily understood in light of such an approach.
The first phase of this stop procedure arises when the officer
70. See United States v. Zemke, 457 F.2d 110 (7th Cir. 1972) (officer's observation
of altered registration number on motorcycle validated initial intrusion and sufficient
probable cause existed to arrest and further search) ; United States v. Tramontana, 460
F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1972)
(probable cause for arrest present where officers observed
suspicious conduct of defendant and trunk full of stolen articles); United States v.
Lepinski, 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972) (officers stopped defendant's car to check out
registration and probable cause was established upon affidavit to search for pistol).
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initially decides to confront an individual upon observing suspicious
circumstances. The exact nature of the circumstances varies to a
certain extent, but almost all instances involve some type of suspect
criminal behavior. For example, sufficient suspicion existed when officers observed two men parked with two girls in an area where
several recent rapes occured. 71 To the extent that a brief investigation was felt to be necessary 72 the stop was justified if limited to
this purpose. Questioning of the suspects should be directed to the
reasons for their presence and determining whether or not the girls
were in any danger.
In similar situations, some courts validate the initial intrusion to
stop if the officer's observations were extensive 8 or where the activity observed was corroborated by other factors. 74 For example,
an officer's observation of the defendant, coupled with reports from
75
complainants describing him, may be a sufficient premise for a stop
if the officer's continued perception does not dissipate the suspicion
raised. An officer's initial observation may be corroborated with his
own further observation to justify an intrusion, 78 but plain equivocal
conduct will not support the diligence of overzealous law enforcement, 77 even if the stop ultimately leads to a discovery of contra7s
band.
In the recent case of Orricer v. South Dakota, 79 the observations
of the officers involved nothing more than watching the defendant's
car, with out-of-state license plates, approach them in the opposite
lane of traffic. The officers in question had been patrolling the street
in search of possible suspects who had escaped from a burglary
an hour earlier. The defendant's car was pulled over merely because
the officers "decided to check it out and see who was in it."' ' 0 Once
stopped, 81 Orricer was questioned while a county sheriff looked into
71. United States v. Wickizer, No. 72-1138 (8th Cir. Sept. 13, 1972).
72. In commenting on the suspicious circumstances upon which the initial stop
ensued, the Court was satisfied that "[t]he officer's concern over previous rapes in the
area and his impression of the frightened appearance of the young girls gave cause for
further Investigation." United States v. Wicklzer, No. 72-1138, 4 (8th Cir. Sept. 13, 1972)
(emphasis added).
73. Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972); Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d
169 (8th Cir. 1969). See note 70 supra.
74. United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 402 U.S.
973 (1971). Cf. United States v. Bowers, 458 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Dryden v. United
States, 457 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Leazar 460 F.2d 982 (9th Cir.
1972) ; United States v. Rodriquez, 459 F.2d 983 (9th Cir. 1972) ; Wade v. United States,
457 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Johnson, 459 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
75. United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970).
76. Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969).
77. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971).
78. Id.
79. Orricer v. South Dakota, No. 71-1516 (8th Cir. Sept. 21, 1972).
80. Id. at 3.
81. When the officers put on their red light to pull defendant's car over to the
curb, the stop was Involuntary and there existed a temporary seizure. Carpenter v.
Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1969). After such a stop, a brief flashlight search of
the car may ensue If reasonable and not intensive or exploratory In scope. See generally
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the car and removed a pair of gloves from the front seat. The defendant was then brought into custody by the police, and the gloves
were subsequently proven to have a substance on them which connected the defendant to the burglary.
Without more than out of state license plates to corroborate the
officers' suspicions initiating the investigatory stop, the Court did
not find any reasonable justification supporting their actions. 2 In
listing the criteria of the observation, it was found that: "(1)
a burglary had been committed approximately an hour before the
car was observed; (2) the car had out-of-state license plates; (3)
the car was observed at approximately 3:45 a. M." '8 s Accordingly,
it was held that the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated. The court, applying Terry, said:
While the officers may have acted in good faith, an irrelevant consideration in these situations where the facts are to
be viewed "objectively," we believe they acted on an "inarticulate hunch" rather than "specific and articulable facts,
which taken together with rational inferences from those
facts" would "warrant a man of reasonable caution to intrude upon an individual's Fourth Amendment rights. .. ."
We therefore conclude that the stopping of Orricer's car under the facts presented by this case was an unreasonable
4
seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The ultimate affect of such reasoning was to exclude the gloves
from evidence inasmuch as they were obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure. The observation by the officers was not found
to be suspicious enough 5 and the decision to stop based on those
circumstances was unjustified.
The observations in Orricer were not corroborated by any other
specific facts which might have substantiated the decision of the officers to make the stop. Such substantiating facts were found to be
present in Carpenter v. Sigler."" In that case the defendants were
observed in a small town which had been subjected to a series of
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763-64 (1969); United States v. Parham, 458 F.2d
438, 439 (8th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973

(1971).

82. See United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d" 15 (10th Cir. 1972) (detention must be
based on reasonable grounds if not probable cause where officer stopped vehicle because be suspected that it might be stolen).
83.
Orricer v. South Dakota, No. 71-1516, 8 (8th Cir. Sept. 21, 1972).
84. Id. at 10.
85. For a sampling of cases among the circuit courts demonstrating the varying
contents upon which suspicious circumstances were found to exist see United States v.
Bowers, 458 F.2d 1045 (5th Cir. 1972) ; Dryden v. United States, 457 F.2d 1244, (5th Cir.
1972) ; United States v. Leazar, 460 F.2d 982 (9th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Rodriquez,
459 F.2d 983

(9th Cir. 1972); Wade v. United States, 457

F.2d

335

(9th Cir. 1972);

United States v. Johnson, 459 F.2d 1229 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Davis, 458
F.2d 819

86.

(D.C. Cir. 1972).

Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir. 1969).
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burglaries. The suspicion of the officers was first raised when they
did not recognize the car and noticed that it had out-of-county license
plates. Had the officers proceeded to stop the car immediately, the
precipitating suspicion under the authority of Orricer, would probably not have been well founded.8 7 The crucial distinguishing factor
in Carpenter appears to be the subsequent surveillance of the defendant by the officers. The officers watched the car move slowly by
several closed businesses before they commenced their investigatory
stop. During the initial questioning several burglary tools"8 were observed on the floor of the car, and the ensuing arrest for their
unlawful possession was a proper premise for the issuance of a
search warrant. Hence, by not reacting immediately and stopping
the defendants merely on the basis on their out-of-county license
plates, the officers in Carpenter first "established" their suspicion
by surveillance, and then proceeded to investigate.
The corroboration to justify the decision to stop does not necessarily involve a collateral and independent source. Observation of
a known burglar's car8 9 was held reasonable enough to justify 0 an
"investigory stop" 91 if the subsequent questions were limited to dissipating or substantiating the initial suspicion of the confronting of-

ficer.

2

This preliminary phase constitutes that observation by the police
officer antecedent to any actual confrontation between himself and
the suspect, and "in justifying the particular intrusion the police
officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
9
warrant that intrusion.1 3
The "specific and articulable facts" which the officer must point
to are ideally judged by applying an objective test 94 to the facts
presented. The cases reveal that the observation during this pre-confrontation stage cannot be at the mere whim of the officer inasmuch
87. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
88. There have been several other cases commenting on the degree of probability
established by the mere possession of burglary tools. See, e.g., Chaney v. Wainwright, 460
F.2d 1263 (5th Cir. 1972) (observation of burglary tools led to arrest of defendant).
Of. United States v. Leal, 460 F.2d 385 (9th Mr. 1972) (observation of large amount
of cash established probable cause for further investigation in regards to stolen travelers
checks). See also note 70 supra.
89. Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972).
90. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ; White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250 (8th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928 (8th Cir. 1970) ; Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169 (8th Cir.
1969).
91. Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064, 1067 (8th CIr. 1972).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Jensen, No. 71-1424 (8th Cir. May 12, 1972) (the questioning after the stop was held to be irrelevant and inadmissible when the officers interrogated defendants about a bank robbery conspiracy while the purpose of the stop was for
occupying a stolen car).
93. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
94. Id. at 22. See note 58 eupra.
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as the courts consider his impression and interpretation of the situation as measured with the actual facts.
Once the initial decision to stop has been made and the confrontation occurs, the second stage of the investigatory stop is encountered. This involves the actual stop and continued detention of
the suspect while questioning is pursued to examine the circumstance
as observed by the officer. It is at this point that some objective
standards of Terry become applicable, with recent decisions centering on the questions of "(1) whether the facts warranted the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment rights and (2) whether
the scope of the intrusion was reasonably related 'to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place'." 95
This standard is particularly important because there is usually
no probable cause present, and the stop is now a detention constituting a seizure under the Fourth Amendment." Such detention must
be narrowly limited to the purpose for which it was invoked, with
the precipitating suspicion serving as the guiding criterion. Consequently in a case where a valid stop had occured and guns were
seen in the car during the course of the preliminary investigation,
it was held that there existed sufficient justification for continued
possession, which
questioning resulting in an arrest for their unlawful
97
seizure.
and
search
further
a
in turn validated
It oftentimes happens that during this preliminary interrogation,
tools98 or contraband9 9 are observed by the officer which definitely
corroborate his initial suspicions and warrant a continued stop. Such
questioning may give rise to further suspicion, although no definite
object or illegal activity is observed.1 00 If after questioning the circumstances do not support the officer's suspicion, the stop is to
cease, and the individual confronted may proceed on his way.10 1 However, should the investigation give rise to further suspicion, whether
95. United States v. Wickizer, No. 72-1138 (8th Cir. Sept. 13, 1972), quoting Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d 169, 171 (8th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Nicholas, 448
F.2d 622, 624 (8th Cir. 1971); United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, 932 (8th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396, 398
(8th Cir. 1970).
96. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). See note 6 supra.
97. One Court was quite positive in holding the subsequent search and seizure valid:
It is a recognized principle that, assuming the existence of probable cause
to arrest, automobiles and other vehicles may be searched without warrants
as incident to the arrest "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
In which the warrant must be sought."
United States v. Harflinger, 436 F.2d 928, 933 (8th Cir. 1971), quoting Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). See BrInegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949);
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764 n.9 (1969) ; United States v. Lepinski, 460 F.2d
234 (10th Cir. 1972).
98. Fields v. Swenson, 459 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1972); Carpenter v. Sigler, 419 F.2d
169 (8th Cir. 1969).
99. United States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8th Cir. 1971).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Wickizer, No. 72-1138 (8th Cir. Sept. 13, 1972).
101. White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying note
135 nfra.
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arising from the questioning itself or subjective corroborating circumstances, 102 a further detention for investigation may ensue.
When such is the case, the third phase of the investigatory stop
arises and as shown by recent decisions the practicality of Terry's
guidelines are invoked:
Balancing the need for further investigation, notwithstanding
the lack of probable cause, and objectively viewing all the
existing circumstances, the limited intrusion [is] permissible. Simply because the initial questioning might give the
appearance that "all is well," if an officer has a justified
basis for the initial intrusion, he may take whatever additional action which would "warrant a man of reasonable
caution" under the circumstance to take. 103
This delicate test balances the right of the individual to be secure
in his person against unlawful searches and seizures as opposed
-to the state's right to further investigate the circumstances. This
is of utmost importance. The individual may now be stopped and
04
his person seized without the existence of any probable cause.
Both Terry and Adams gloss over this issue by attempting to draw
a fine distinction between a seizure and an arrest. The inadequacy
of such reasoning becomes manifest when an on-the-street encounter arises, affording the individual no immediate relief from the
pressing queries of a police officer.
As often happens, probable cause arises at some stage during
this tripartite investigatory stop. If, however, any stage fails to
pass constitutional muster, all subsequent stages are vitiated and
any evidence obtained will be inadmissible. Conversely, once probable cause is established the several phases of the stop immediately merge and an arrest may be effected.
Finally, it should be noted that a limited frisk for weapons
may be conducted at any time during the confrontation if the offi10 5
cer reasonably perceives any danger to himself or the public.
2. Suspicion Based On An Informant's Tip
While the use of informants in the law of search and seizure
developed gradually, 10 6 it has only been since the recent Adams
102. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Holman v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972)
United States v. Moore, 459 F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
(emphasis
103. United States v. Wickizer, No. 72-1138, 4 (8th Cir. Sept. 13, 1972)
added).
104. [Ulnder the Terry case Fourth Amendment standards of "reasonableness"
are applicable where an investigative search follows a permissible "seizure"
of the person short of an actual arrest. Under these circumstances, the demanding requisites of probable cause do not control.
Id. at 3, citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20-22 (1968). See notes 5, 6 euvra.
105. See notes 8, 10-14 supra.
106. See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 4,43 (1971); United States v.
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case that an informant's tip was recognized as constitutionally solvent in stop and frisk procedure. To a large extent then, much of
what follows is necessarily premised upon the use of informants
in the area of search and seizure with the recognition that their
probable
use has become a well founded method of establishing
10 7
issue.
may
warrant
cause upon which a valid search
In Aguilar v. Texas, °s for example, the Court allowed the use
of an informant's tip to support a valid warrant inasmuch as the
total circumstances were independently viewed by an objective
magistrate. 0 9 In allowing their use, a two prong test was established requiring that the informant be demonstrated to be trustworthy and that the source from which he draws his ,information
be reliable."1 ° This test remains currently viable"' in determining
the validity of information supplied, although it has been further
2
explicated in the cases of Spinelli v. United States," United States
4
v. Harris,"8 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire."
As explained in Spinelli, a warrant may properly lissue even
though the information supplied to the officer submitting the affi-

davit has been gathered from another informant, i.e., hearsay upon
hearsay. 115 The informant in Spinelli did not meet the reliability
criterion of Aguilar, and although the trustworthiness test was met,
Spinelli V. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar v.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971)
Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960): Draper v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964)
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949)
McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir. 1969).
107. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
108. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
109. Id. at 114. See Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
110. See, e.g., United States v. leve, No. 71-1622 (8th Cir. June 27, 1972).
111. Id. In commenting on the test in Aguilar the court opined:
[Aln affidavit may properly rest on hearsay as long as it sufficiently presents to the issuing judicial officer the underlying facts and circumstances
from
from which the informant drew his conclusions and (2)
both (1)
which the affiant concluded that the informant was credible and his information reliable. We agree that such are appropriate standards.
Id. at 6.
112. Spinelli v. United States, 394 U.S. 419 (1969).
113. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
114. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
115. If the affidavit rests on hearsay-an informant's report-what is necessary
under Aguilar is one of two things: the informant must declare whether
(1) that he has himself seen or perceived, the fact or facts asserted; or
(2) that his information is hearsay, but there is good reason for believing
it-Perhaps one of the usual grounds for crediting hearsay information. The
first presents few problems since the report, although hearsay, purports to
be first-hand observation, remaining doubt centers on the honesty of the Informant, and that worry is dissipated by the officer's previous experience
with the informant. The other basis for accepting the informant's report is
more complicated. But if, for example, the informer's hearsay comes from
one of the actors in the crime in the nature of admission against interest,
the affidavit giving this information should be held sufficient.
[T]here are limited special circumstances in which an "honest" informant's report, if sufficiently detailed, will in effect verify itself-that
is, the magistrate when confronted with such detail could reasonable Infer
that the informant had gained his information in a reliable way.
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 425 (1969) (White, J., concurring).
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the affidavit and warrant were invalidated. Looking at the Spinelli
holding from an objective standpoint, both prongs of the Aguilar
test adequately served as a protective measure under Fourth
Amendment standards in establishing the trustworthiness of the information supplied. However, strict adherence to both requirements has since experienced a somewhat diluted application, although its vitality is still recognized.11
In United States v. Harris"7 the Court followed Aguilar and
Spinelli by requiring the informant to explain how he received his
information. Nevertheless, the decision did involve a looser application of Aguilar than Spinelli, and in fact rejected a careful reading of the latter by allowing the use of probative information and
crediting the affidavit based on an unnamed informant. Since one
informant had knowledge of the defendant's background, a substantial basis11 8 existed to rely on the unnamed informant.
As a consequence of Harris, the courts -have allowed a broad
reading of Aguilar in determining the trustworthiness of the informant supplying the information to the police" 9 and not the original
unnamed informant. When one informant gives information to another, and he in turn supplies the same to police upon which an
affidavit supporting a warrant is allowed, the strict test of Aguilar
appears to be merely guiding. This point is clearly demonstrated
in the recent case of United States v. Smith"02 where the Court held
that in determining the validity of an affidavit supporting a warrant, a magistrate "need not catagorically reject this double hearsay information."'' 2' Rather, the current approach indicates that:
[The magistrate] is called upon to evaluate this information as well as all other information in the affidavit in order
to determine whether it can be reasonably inferred 'that
the informant gained his information in a reliable way'....
The magistrate must canvass the affidavit and the informer's tip as a whole and measure it against2 2Aguilar standards in order to assess its probative value.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Kleve, No. 71-1622 (8th Mr. June 27, 1972).
117. United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573 (1971).
118. See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). Cf. Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948).
119. In United States v. Smith, No. 71-1622 (8th
ir. June 27, 1972), the court spoke
directly to the Issue sought to be established through the Informant as reliable. The main
concern In hearsay based upon hearsay Information Is not particularly with the original
Informant, but rather, as the opinion points out:
The crucial question . . . is not . . . whether the afflant can attest to the

reliability or credibility of the second Individual, but whether the Information furnished by the Informant, taken as a whole, can be said to be reliable.
Id. at 7.
120. United States v. Smith, No. 71-1622 (8th Cir. June 27, 1972).
121. 1d. at 5.
122. Id. at 5-6.
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The criteria sought must be of substance as determined by its
trustworthiness, and reliability ought not rest upon "casual rumor
accusation based merely on an
circulating in the underworld or 1an
23
reputation.'
general
individual's
Similar to the development of the use of informants in the law
of search and seizure, the concomitant doctrine of stop and frisk
is beginning to find a more prevalent use of informants in predicating a stop for investigatory purposes. Although the Supreme
Court had never expressly sanctioned their use before Adams, the
Terry decision did not necessarily preclude this practice. For example, as indicated by one court:
It is true that most of the cases involving an 'investigative
stop' under the Terry case have involved personal observation of suspicious activity by the police officer. However,
we do not believe that the justification for an investigative
is necessarily predicated
stop under the Fourth Amendment
1 24
upon personal observation.
To this extent then, Adams may perhaps be regarded as an extension of Terry only in the sense that it further defines the permissible practices of stop and frisk by allowing the use of informants.
The novelty of Adams is that it addressed the validity of a stop
1 25
which Terry manifestly avoided.
In relying on an informant's tip, the "specificity of information' '1 26 upon which an officer must base his suspicion is still controlling. Hence, where an informant relays hearsay information to
the police a valid stop may proceed 1 7 if the facts and circumstances upon which the police acted were sufficiently specific to allow a limited intrusion. 128 This may be determined in the initial
phase of the stop if the information supplied is corroborated by
the officer's personal observation or similar information from an
independent source. This element of corroboration is particularly
crucial" 9 and "[a] mere assertion that the informant is reliable
is not enough."'' 8
123. McCreary v. Sigler, 406 F.2d 1264, 1268 (8th Clr. 1969).
124. White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, 251 (8th Cir. 1971).
125. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). See text accompanying note 7 supra.
126. White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, 251 (8th Cir. 1971). See also Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968).
127. White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250 (8th Cir. 1971).
128. Id. at 251, Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 n.18 (1968).
129. One of the critical and troublesome questions here is whether there exists
sufficient corroboration of the reliability of the informant.
Le Dent v. Wolff, No. 71-1656, 3 (8th Cir. May 19, 1972). Cf. Spinelli v. United States,
393 U.S. 419 (1969).
130. Le Dent v. Wolff, No. 71-1656, 3 (8th Cir. May 19, 1972). See United States V.
Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 579 (1971); Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 416 (1969).
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Assuming the reliability and trustworthiness of the informant,
a stop may proceed to the extent that the information given is personally substantiated by the confronting officer. This stop is to be
for investigatory purposes only, unless sufficient probable cause arises to effect an arrest.1 3' If information is relayed over a police
radio and the officers immediately approach the defendant and ar1 82
rest him, the uncorroborated broadcast will not validate the stop.
But an investigatory stop may commence if additional circumstances are found to justifiably raise the suspicions of the officer. 83
If, for example, an officer stops a suspect on the basis of information supplied and carefully limits his questioning in an attempt to
dissipate or substantiate the suspicions aroused, the individual confronted can be detained only so long as his answers and the surrounding circumstances corroborate the description of the informant. In White v. United States 84 the Court addressed this issue. In
that case, officers approached the defendant with information that
he was in possession of counterfeit bills. Without more, a stop occurred for preliminary questioning and the defendant was found to
be slumped over his steering wheel. The arrest for unlawful possession of an altered drivers license was validated and the antecedent stop was held to be justified. In commenting on the officers'
actions in initially stopping White, the Court said:
T]hat they had no plans to take the defendant into
custody at that time, and that if his indentification was in
order they would have had to let him go. This of course is
consistent with the theory that the stop was for purposes of
investigation only.3 5
Had the defendant's identification been proper, the information
that he was in possession of counterfeit bills would not have been
corroborated during the initial phases of the stop. This would seemingly suggest at least a minimal standard of reliability to be placed
on an informant's tip, and the investigatory nature of the stop
could be analyzed in somewhat of an objective manner.
The courts, however, do not always approach such situations
with the same analytical framework. One of the most recent cases
decided under Adams, United States v. Azzone, 136 allowed a stop
131. See United States ex rel. Hollman v. Rundle, 461 F.2d 758 (3d Cir. 1972) (proper
stop and sufficient probable cause for an arrest, search, and seizure where police radio
broadcast was corroborated with photograph of defendant); United States v. Moore, 459
F.2d 1360 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (radio broadcast description of defendants justified stop
which lead to arrest).
132. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
133. E.g., White v. United States, 448 F.2d 250, (8th Cir. 1971).
134.

Id.

135.
136.

Id. at 253 (emphasis added).
United States v. Azzone, No. 72-1091 (8th Cir. August 1, 1972).
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of the defendant based only on an informant's tip, relayed to the
confronting officers by a cooperating police department. The original informant was allegedly reliable and his tip described the
place, license number, and car which the defendant would be driving
in a rendezvous for a sale of stolen securities. The confronting officers arrived at the meeting place early and immediately recognized
the defendant from the description provided. At the time of this
observation, Azzone was not doing anything particularly suspicious,
except for the fact that he was near the car.
Relying solely on this information, the officers approached the
defendant, identified themselves and requested the same in return.
At this time there did not exist any probable cause nor were the
circumstances notably suspicious. This confrontation proceeded on
mere double hearsay information which was held to constitute sufficient suspicion to justify the investigatory stop.
The officers asked the defendant if they could search his car
and he consented. While a search of the passenger area ensued one
of the officers asked for the key to the trunk. The defendant pointed
to the keys in the ignition, and after a fruitless search of car, an
attempt was made to open the trunk. At this point Azzone dropped
a key down the window well and was immediately arrested. The
key was later retrieved and most of the stolen securities were recovered from the trunk.
The impact that the informant's tip will have in the area of
stop and frisk can readily be realized from the facts in Azzone.
The antecedent suspicion of the officers was based only on an informant's tip. For any subsequent investigation to continue pursuant thereto the officers had to press their queries to satisfy or
dispel the information given. To proceed with this stop based solely on the tip provided would necessarily have involved a total
search and seizure of the defendent's car and person. Indeed, an
arrest and full search ensued when the officers sought to obtain the
stolen securities which the defendant was said to have had in his
possession. The ultimate result was to allow the informant's tip to
determine the permissible extent of the investigatory stop. The
officers were not about to leave the area until they knew for sure
whether the defendant had stolen securities in his possession. The
fact that the defendant dropped a key down the window may have
been sufficient grounds to continue the detention, however, it is
doubtful whether this constituted probable cause to arrest and search.
Considerable weight is given to the tip provided by the informant, especially in light of the fact that an underlying affidavit is
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not required. The courts which find such stops valid usually proceed
on the reasoning expressed in Azzone that:
The Fourth Amendment does not require a policeman who
lacks the precise level of information necessary for probable cause to arrest to simply shrug his shoulders and allow a
crime to occur or a criminal to escape. On the contrary...
it may be the essence
of good police work to adopt an inter. 7
mediate response1
This intermediate response was defined in Adams and implicitly
recognized in Azzone when the Court held that:
A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine
his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while
obtaining more information, may be most reasonable in light
of the facts known to the officer at the time. se
The quantum of information supplied by the informant would seem
to be the only plausible measurement of a justifiable momentary detention when the confronting officer commences a stop on such a
tip.
The ultimate affect of a stop is to intrude into the privacy of
an individual protected by the Fourth Amendment. In such instances
the determinative question is one of reasonableness, and it is just
that standard which is subject to the vague interpretations of stopping
and frisking on an informant's tip.3 9 Although the case law subsequent to Adams is still relatively sparse, a trend toward permissive
police practices can be expected.
Further guidelines can probably be suggested by analyzing the
source from which the information emanates. In such instances the
informant may be either known and reliable,'4 0 known but untested,
or anonymous.' 4 1 The order of reliability attributed to each type proceeds in the order listed from most to least dependable. Thus, a
higher degree of corroboration should be required of the investigating
137. Id. at 7, citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 145 (1972). See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968).
(emphasis added). See Terry v.
138. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972)
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968) ; Gaines v. Craven, 448 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1971) ; United
States v. Unverzagt, 424 F.2d 396 (8th Cir. 1970).
139. The vagueness of constitutional standards in this area was stressed in Le Dent
v. Wolff, No. 71-1656 (8th Cir. May 19, 1972) which recognized "that the Supreme Court
seems to be of several minds on the quantum of corroboration which is necessary to
sufficiently demonstrate that an informant is reliable." Id. at 3.
140. Information received from witnesses is generally received by the courts as highly
reliable. See, e.g., United States v. McQueen, 458 F.2d 1049 (3d Cir. 1972); Conley
v. Beto, 460 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Mallory, 460 F.2d 243 (10th Cir.
1972).
141. See LaFave, supra note 12, at 76-78.
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officer in relation to the diminishing trustworthiness of the informa142
tive source.
Assuming arguendo that stops based on an informant's tip are
constitutional, it is still important to take into consideration the nature of the confrontation. The investigation by an officer continues
until his discretion exhausts the possibility that the information given
is true.143 A frisk may be conducted pursuant to this stop with the
distinct possibility of discovering contraband, which may of course
be admitted into evidence. Such an extension of Terry comes dangerously close to allowing the frisk to justify the stop.
THE CURRENT LAW OF STOP AND FRISK
One of the major concerns after Terry was whether a stop and
frisk may be initiated in situations not involving a serious crime or
felony. Indeed, it has been said that whether a stop and frisk is
justified could be determined by the severity of the crime committed." The investigatory stop was thought to be a most appropri142. The following cases are indicative of the consideration given by circuit courts
to circumstances corroborating the information supplied with personal observation or
other factors weighted in deference to the trustworthiness of the source: United States
v. Brown, 457 F.2d 731 (1st Cir. 1972); United States v. Wolfe, 457 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.
1972) ; United States v. Davis, 461 F.2d 1026 (3d Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Fields,
458 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Wycockl, 457 F.2d 1155' (5th Cir. 1972) ;
United States v. Mitchell, 457 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1972); United States v. Wixom, 460
United
United States v. Leon, 460 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1972)
l.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1972)
States v. Miller, 460 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1972).
143. See generally United States v .Rosenberg, 458 F.2d 1183 (5th Cir. 1972); Urnited
States v. Ford, 461 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Bailey, 458 F.2d 408 (9th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Richardson, 461 F.2d 935 (10th Cir. 1972) ; United States
v. Troutman, 458 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1972).
144. Professor LaFave presented his thoughts on this when discussing the possible
limitations concomitant with a temporary seizure for Investigation:
[N]ote should be taken of the fact that the stop-and-frisk decisions leave
ample room for the development of other kinds of limitations on the power
of police to make temporary seizure for investigation. For example, one
might ask whether the nature of the suspected crime should make any difference, not merely in terms of variable probable cause, but also In determining whether a stopping should ever be permitted. In Terry the anticipated crime was armed robbery, while in Peters It was burglary; both are
serious offenses and not Infrequently attended by violence. Sibron, on the
other hand, involved possession of narcotics . . . this may have contributed
In some measure to the courts refusal to permit Inferences in that case as
generous as in the other two-the failure to consider, for example, If it was
not unusual for a person to spend eight consecutive hours loitering in an
area frequented by narcotic addicts. Justice Harlan's analysis of Sibron Is
also revealing, for he says that the real question Is whether there was a
need for Immediate action, and adds that he would apply as a general
formula . . . that the officer must reasonably suspect a felony.
LaFave, supra note 2, at 65 (footnotes omitted). The drafters of the Model Code of
Pre-Arraignmeat Procedure were also of the same mind when they recognized In both
the notes to the Stop-and-Frisk statute and comments thereto:
The section [§ 110.2] deals with the problems of abuse by limiting the stop
and therefore the frisk to crimes Involving danger of Injury to persons or
of loss of property, and by limiting the stop moreover in all but one situation [road blocks] to the res gestae of such crimes.
ALI, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, note at 10 (Proposed Official Draft
No. 1, April 19, 1972). It was further discussed in the commentary that:
The Reporter has sought to accomplish these results by limiting the stop to
circumstances Involving the particular case a direct threat to persons or
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ate response when an officer was confronted with a serious felony
situation. A lack of probable cause should not deter the officer from
taking preventative action 145 for which the sanctions of stop and frisk
were born. This is a seemingly justified measure, particularly when
consideration is given to the hard realities of on-the-street encounters.
It is important, however, that the distinction between prevention and
detection be recognized, 146 with the latter necessarily requiring closer
scrutiny than the former. This follows because police are by their
profession "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting
out crime."'14

7

To allow a stop and frisk when in the process of de-

tecting crime, which actually involves everyday routine police work,
would reduce individual rights to the whim of the confronting officer.
The Adams Court comes dangerously close to this proposition.
Even after the Terry decision it was hardly contemplated that a
stop and frisk would be validated in the case of possessory offenses. 14 8

Using Terry as a guide, the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure very carefully defined three instances where a stop would
be authorized while still allowing sufficient latitude for practical
law enforcement efforts,'1 49 viz:

(1) Persons in suspicious circum-

property. Moreover, in all but one situation the stop is allowed where the
danger is an immediate or recent danger.
Id. at 117. The "one exception" referred to in both of the above quotes alludes to the
stopping of vehicles at roadblocks. The drafters were apparently of the opinion that in
the apprehension of fleeing felons, the exigencies would warrant such a precaution.
145. Terry v. Ohio, 892 U.S. 1, 35 n.1 (1968); Parker v. Municipal Judge, 427 P.2d
642, 645 (Nev. 1967) (dissenting opinion). See LaFave, supra note 2, at 66-67.
146. Id.
147. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948).
148. There would be considerable merit in barring the police from employing
stop and frisk for minor crimes like possession of narcotics in order to
remove the temptation for the police to go on fishing expeditions for contraband.
LaFave, supra note 2, at 65. This reasoning at once recognizes that the individual approached would be hard pressed to assert the protective measures of the Fourth Amendment. If approached and stopped, without more, the ensuing frisk is in fact a search
with the resulting evidence justifying the antecedent intrusion. This is clearly ex post
facto inasmuch as the frisk would justify the stop. See, e.g., Kuh, In-Field Interrogation:
Stop, Question, Detention and Frisk, 3 CnIM. L. BULL. 597, 604 (1967).
149. ALI, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 110.2 (Proposed Official
Draft No. 1, 1972):
Section 110.2. Stopping of Persons
(1)
Cases in Which Stop Is Authorized. A law enforcement officer,
lawfully present in any place, may, in the following circumstances, order a
person to remain in the officer's presence near such place for such period
as is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purposes authorized in this subsection, but in no case for more than twenty minutes.
Persons in suspicious circumstances relating to certain misde(a)
meanors and felonies.
(1) Such person is observed in circumstances such that the
officer reasonably suspects that he has just committed, is committing,
or is about to commit a misdemeanor or felony, involving danger of
forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or damage to property, and
(ii)
such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify
the Identification of such person, to obtain or verify an account of
such person's presence or conduct, or to determine whether to arrest
such Person.
(b)
Witnesses near scene of certain misdemeanors and felonies.
(i)
The officer has reasonable cause to believe that a misde-

NOTES

155

demeanor or felony, involving danger of forcible injury to persons or
of appropriation of or damage to property, has just been committed
near the place where he finds such person, and
(ii)
the officer has reasonable cause to believe that such person has knowledge of material aid in the investigation of such crtme,
and
(ill)
such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify
identification of such person, or to obtain an account of such crime.
(c)
Suspects sought for certain previously committed felonies.
(1) The officer has reasonable cause to believe that a felony
involving danger of forcible injury to persons or of appropriation of or
damage to property has been committed, and
(i)
he reasonably suspects such person may have committed
it, and
(iii)
such action is reasonably necessary to obtain or verify
the identification of such person for the purpose of determining
whether to arrest him for such felony.
(2)
Stopping of Vehicles at Roadblock. A law enforcement officer
may, if
(a)
he has reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed; and
(b)
stopping all or most vehicles moving in a particular direction
or directions is reasonably necessary to permit a search for the perpetrator or victim of such felony in view of the seriousness and special circumstances of such felony,
order the drivers of such vehicles to stop, and may search such vehicles
to the extent necessary to accomplish such purpose. Such action shall be
accomplished as promptly as possible under the circumstances.
(3)
Use of Force. In order to exercise the authority conferred in
subsections (1) and (2) of this section, a law enforcement officer may use
such force, other than deadly force, as is reasonably necessary to stop any
person or vehicle or to cause any person to remain in the officer's presence.
(4)
Frisk for Dangerous Weapons. A law enforcement officer who
has stopped any person pursuant to this section may, if the officer reasonably believes that his safety or the safety of others then present so requires, search for any dangerous weapon by an external patting of such
person's outer clothing. If in the course of such search he feels an object
which he reasonably believes to be a dangerous weapon, he may take such
action as is necessary to examine such object.
(5)
Questioning of Suspects.
(a)
Warnings. If a law enforcement officer stops any person who
he suspects or has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a
crime, the officer shall warn such person as promptly as is reasonable
under the circumstances, and in any case before engaging in any sustained
questioning
(i)
that such person is not obliged to say anything, and anything he says may be used in evidence against him,
(i)
that within twenty minutes he will be released unless
he is arrested. [,]
[(iii) that if he is arrested he will be taken to a police station where he may promptly communicate by telephone with counsel,
relatives or friends, and
(iv)
that he will not be questioned unless he wishes, and
that if he wishes to consult a lawyer or have a lawyer present during questioning, he will not be questioned at this time, and that after
being taken to the stationhouse a lawyer will be furnished him prior
to questioning if he is unable to obtain one.]
(b)
Limitations on Questioning. No law enforcement officer shall
question a person detained pursuant to the authority in this section who
he suspects or has reasonable cause to suspect may have committed a crime,
if such person has indicated in any manner that he does not wish to be
questioned, or that he wishes to consult counsel before submitting to any
questioning.
(6)
Action to Be Taken After Period of Stop. Unless an officer actIng hereunder arrests a person during the time he is authorized by subsections (1) and (2) of this section to require such person to remain in his
presence, he shall, at the end of such time, inform such person that he is
free to go.
(7)
Records Relating to Persons Stopped. In accordance with regulations to be issued pursuant to Section 10.03, a law enforcement officer,
who has ordered 'any person to remain in his presence pursuant to this
section, shall with reasonable promptness thereafter make a record of the
circumstances and purposes of the stop.
[Hereinafter cited as M.C.P.P.]
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stances relating to certain misdemeanors and felonies; 150 (2) Witnesses near the scene of certain misdemeanors and felonies;1 51
152
(3) Suspects sought for certain previously committed felonies.
The drafters were keenly aware of limiting the permissibility of
the stop to "cases of clear necessity.' 1 53 It was strongly manifested
that possessory offenses were to be excluded from the predicates of
a stop, especially those involving narcotics. 54 This, of course, is in
direct conflict with the Adams decision which in fact involved a stop
and frisk for the possession of narcotics augmented only by reports
that the defendant was carrying a gun. 55 There is some authority
indicating that "narcotics discovered in the course of a frisk might
be excluded unless a weapon is also discovered,"'156 however, the favored approach indicates that "it is preferable to deal with this problem by removing narcotics offenses from the scope of the stop and
'
frisk authority altogether.' 1
The strong arguments for not allowing a stop in the case of
possessory offenses are supported by the plausible alternatives of
excluding narcotics found during the frisk 5 and recognizing that undercover agents are effective in obtaining information on drug traffic
which often gives rise to probable cause for arrest. 59 This reasoning
may at first appear circular when it is considered that the stop is
predicated upon the suspicious circumstances as perceived by the
officer. However, the main concern of those advocating the alternatives is to safeguard the requirements of probable cause, and protect
against the frisk justifying the stop. Consequently, when a stop commences on suspicion that a non-violent crime (possessory offense)
has been committed or is about to be committed, the frisk should
not be allowed to the extent that contraband entirely unrelated to
the stop is discovered. This would be commensurate with the objective test of Terry limiting the frisk to a weapons search for protective purposes only.1 60
Id. § 110.2 (1) (a) (i) (ii).
Id. § 110.2 (1) (b) (1) (11) (1it).
Id. § 110.2 (1) (c) (1) (ii) (111).
M.C.P.P. at 9.
[T]he hope was expressed that ways be found to prevent the frisk from
being used as a pretext for a search for narcotics . . . Thereby vice, narcotics and gambling offenses, as well as many minor crimes are removed
from the scope of the stop, and the occasions for abuse presented in respect
to those crimes reduced. In removing narcotics offenses from the scope of
the stop, the Reporters do not, of course, intend to minimize their Seriousness. Rather they conclude . . . that the stop may not be a sufficiently useful law enforcement technique in respect to narcotics offenses to Justify the
grave temptation for abuse that the attendant frisk presents in such cases.
M.C.P.P. § 110.2, note at 9-10. See a7so commentary at 118.
155. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972). See text accompanying notes 32-37 aupra.
156. M.C.P.P. § 110.2, comment at 118.
157. Id.
158. Id. See LaFave, supra note 2, at 65-67; 43 ALI, PROCEEDINGS 167 (1966) (remarks
of Harris Steinberg).
159. M.C.P.P. § 110.2, comment at 118-19.
160. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). See text accompanying note 60 supra.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

NoTEs
If Sibron'61 had been decided under the Adams rationale, the of-

ficer's observations would probably have been sufficient to warrant
a stop. This demonstrates that what constitutes reasonable suspicion
now differs considerably from the standards that existed in the Terry
era. 8 2 It has been argued that a standard of "reasonable grounds"
be the guiding criteria for a stop rather than "reasonable suspicion" 63 to believe that the person stopped may be guilty of crime.

This would seem to facilitate objectivity to the extent that reasonable
grounds criteria could be more straightforwardly determined by the
court and confronting officers.
The drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure
had anticipated that reasonable suspicion would be the most satisfactory approach. They relied on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, holding the stop and frisk in Williams v. Adams'" unconstitutional. Without envisioning a reversal by the Supreme Court, the
Code was drafted in deference to the "reasonable suspicion"' 65 standard of Terry based on the confronting officer's observation.1 66 Adams
has already made the newly drafted Code partially obsolete. It must
also be kept in mind that the Terry opinion was directed at the
validity of the search 67 and the officer's action pursuant to the New
York stop and frisk law.168 The consequence of the Terry rationale
was limited to the officer's reasonable suspicion in light of the stat-

ute, with the case law definition of reasonable suspicion being rather
vague.
Adams should give comfort to the thirteen states that have statutory provisions similar to the New York stop and frisk law. 169 Other
states have allowed suspicion based on an informant's tip to predicate
a stop and frisk for possessory offenses without statutory guidance,
leaving the evolution of their case law to the broadly interpreted
provisions of the Fourth Amendment.
161. Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968). See text accompanying notes 11-15 supra;
M,.C.P.P. commentary at 110 n.18.
162. See text accompanying notes 49-59 supra.
163. M.C.P.P. § 110.2, comment at 123; LaFave, aupra note 2, at 70.
164. Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d 394 (2d Cir. 1971). See note 33 supra.
165. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
166. In premising their statutory provisions, the drafters of the Model Code of PreArraignment Procedure felt that the outer limits of stop-and-frisk permissiveness was
reached In 1971:
For a case in which a stop and frisk was held improper in part for lack of
a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, see Williams v. Adams, 441 F.2d
394 (2d Cir. 1971).
M.C.P.P. § 110.2, commentary at 109 n.15.
167. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968). See text accompanying note 7 supra.
168. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney's Supp. 1973). See note 10 supra.
169. ALA. CODE tit. 15 § 118 (Supp. 1971) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-429 to 436 (Supp.
1971) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.151 (1969) ; ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 107-14, 108-1 (1968)
IN. ANN. STAT. § 9-104,8, 9-1050 (Supp. 1972) ; KAN. CODE CraIM. PRoc. § 22-2402 (1970)
LA. CODE CRIM. Pnoc. art. 215.1 (Supp. 1972) ; NEv. REV. STAT. § 171.123-171.1232 (1969)
NEB. REv. STAT. § 29-829 (Supp. 1969) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (Supp. 1971) ; UTAH
CODE ANN. § 77-13-33 to 35 (Supp. 1971) ; Vma CODE ANN. § 19.1-100-2 (Supp. 1972) ; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 968.24-25 (1970).
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In speculating on the extent to which the Supreme Court is willing to go in this area, the recent case of Papachrisou v. City of
Jacksonville"0 may be illustrative. Five cases were appealed that
dealt with convictions under a city vagrancy ordinance. The defendants were arrested for violations including inter alia, loitering, common theft, and disorderly conduct. The arrests were unsubstantiated
by the factual circumstances, but the convictions were nevertheless
sustained by the trial court on the broad provisions of the ordinance
in question.171 In addition to the ordinance's vagueness,'172 the Supreme
Court was directly concerned with "the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the Jacksonville police.' 17 In expressly addressing the validity of the arrests based upon the suspicion of the officers the Court commented:
We allow our police to make arrests only on 'probable cause,'
a Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standard applicable to
the States as well as to the Federal Government. Arresting
a person on suspicion, like arresting a person for investigation, is foreign to our system .... 174
In finding that suspicion alone is not sufficient to justify an arrest,
Papachristouis in accord with the Terry and Adams decisions. But
the Court also doubted the propriety of stopping on mere suspicion
when it said: "A presumption that people . . . who look suspicious
to the police are to become future criminals is too precarious for
a rule of law."' 175 Analogizing Papachristou to the stop and frisk
situation leads to irreconcilable results. In both Terry and Papachristou there was an ordinance 176 or statute 1 77 involved which authorized the initial confrontation of the suspicious individual. However,
in exercising a stricter interpretation of the Fourth Amendment in
vagrancy as opposed to stop and frisk cases, Papachristoufelt that
"[a] direction by a legislature to the police to arrest all 'suspicious'
persons would not pass constitutional muster. ' 178 The only real distinction between this reasoning and the Terry-Adams stop and frisk
approach is that in the former case, an arrest was based entirely
on the general suspicion of the officers. No specific criminal activity
-U.S.92 S.Ct. 839 (1972).
170. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
171. Id. at 840 n.1.
172. See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S.
242 (1987) ; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co. 274 U.S. 445 (1927) ; Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81
(1921).
92 S. Ct. 839, 846 (1972).
-U.S._
173. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
174. Id. at 847 (footnotes omitted).
175. Id. at 848.
U.S._
92 S. Ct. 839, 840 n.1
176. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, (1972).
See notes 10, 169 supra,
(McKinney's
Supp.
1973).
177. N.Y. CoDS CalM. PROC. § 140.50
, 92 S. Ct. 839, 847 (1972).
-U.S.
178. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
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predicated the stop, and the arrest was not founded on any acceptable
standards of probable cause. 7 9 Although Terry and Adams did not
hold that an arrest may ensue on anything less than probable cause,
the stop on mere suspicion could very well culminate in an arrest
if probable cause is thereafter established.
Notwithstanding the narrow reading given to the Fourth Amendment by Papachristou, it is apparent in the area of stop and frisk
that the objective standards of Terry are waning. With the informant's perception substituted for the officer's, the "narrowly drawn
exception"' 180 to the search and seizure rule has indeed given rise
to significant constitutional permissiveness. The objectivity upon
which the officer may interpret an informant's tip to stop and frisk
is guided largely by standards developed in the law of search and
seizure.
If reliance on the informant is based upon sincere law enforcement efforts, then the weighty intrusion on individual freedom may
be justified. However, encounters with police authority are often encumbered by uncomfortable circumstances which should be limited
by the courts whenever possible. The balance to be struck is indeed
delicate, and the ultimate effect should not be to allow a search
and seizure to be conducted on less than probable cause. To do so
would be a blatant abandonment of the Fourth Amendment with only
nominal protection afforded to individual rights.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Adams has extended Terry in two particulars:
(1) a stop and frisk may now proceed on an informant's tip; and
(2) the circumstances investigated need only be possessory in nature.
The permissiveness of this approach is not easily reconciled with
Fourth Amendment guarantees in determining whether there are sufficient suspicious circumstances upon which an officer may justifiably stop an individual. Inasmuch as a stop may be voluntary or
involuntary, the real constitutional question arises when the officer
decides to forcibly detain a suspect for questioning.
First, it must be determined before the stop can be made whether the facts and circumstances warrant further investigation upon
which the officer may confront an individual. If the initial stop is
based upon observation, the officer must be able to point to specififc
and articulable facts which would warrant a man of reasonable diligence to believe that criminal activity may be affot. If the stop is
92 S. Ct. 839
_ U.S .,
179. Compare Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,
(1972), with Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972, and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
See notes 32-67 supra and accompanying text.
180. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 154-55 (1972). See note 47 supra.
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predicated upon an informant's tip, then sufficient reliability of the
informant must be established along with specific corroborating
circumstances.
Secondly, once the decision to stop has been made, the investigatory questions must be limited to dispelling or substantiating those
specific and articulable facts which aroused the officer's suspicion.
In the case of a stop based on an informant's tip, there must be
continuing corroboration during the time that the suspect is involuntarily detained (either by way of questions answered or existing
evidence) in order to justify further interrogation. Likewise, if the
stop was based on observation, the initial suspicion must still remain
after the preliminary questioning. In either case the person stopped
should be free to leave if the precipitating suspicious circumstances
are dispelled by the answers given or no further reason can be established to continue the stop.
Thirdly, should the suspicious circumstances remain unsatisfied
by the answers given, a further investigatory detention is justified,
provided that the investigation is limited to the articulable facts
premising the stop. The balancing test of Terry is invoked at this
stage inasmuch as the seizure now approaches an arrest. The balance
involves the individual's right to be free in his person from an unreasonable search and seizure on the one hand, with the right of the
state on behalf of the public to investigate the possibility of crime
on the other.
Superimposed over the entire three phase stop procedure is the
potential existence of probable cause. Once established, probable
cause allows an immediate arrest which in turn may be followed
by a search and seizure incident thereto. Probable cause may occur
at any stage with its presence at once mooting the stop and frisk
approach.
Further, a protective frisk181 may be conducted to the extent of
a limited weapons pat down. This may also take place at any stage
of the stop, but it usually occurs at the outset.
The effect of Adams is only beginning to be realized, but it may
very well have far reaching ramifications. 8 2 Remembering that reasonableness is the standard Fourth Amendment measurement, allowing a stop on an informant's tip for possessory offenses would seem
to fall just short of flaunting this minimal safeguard. It must be
conceded that the stop procedures are vague and difficult to prac181. The requirements of permissible frisk limitations have also seen considerable liberation. See United States v. Honesty, 459 F.2d 1279 (D.C. Cir. 1972), wherein a
woman's purse was within the scope of a protective search.
182. Id.
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tice, 18 but this does not necessarily warrant an abandonment of constitutional guarantees. Indeed "[t]he vital protections of the Fourth
Amendment cannot be hinged upon the convenience of the police,
prosecutors, and judges."'' s4
With the Terry decision, the Supreme Court begrudingly made
an exception to search and seizure requirements by allowing a stop

and frisk in limited situations. If the strong dissent in Adams is at
all indicative, permissible stop and frisk practices may have reached

their outer limits. The stop and frisk exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment no longer appears to be subject
to the narrow limitations indicated in Terry. As is clearly evidenced
in the Adams decision, judicial treatment of stop and frisk situations

may ultimately lead to a condonation of unfettered discretion in the
police-the result which Justice Douglas condemned in his Terry dis-

sent. If such a result proves true, it may well be better to follow
Justice Douglas' Terry approach and require such a grant of power

to be approved by the deliberate choice of the people through a
Constitutional amendment s5 rather than by a strained and tortured
reading of the Fourth Amendment.
PAUL E. GODLEWSKI

183. Even though the vagueness of probable cause and police practice was recognized
in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), the court nevertheless cautioned:
Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some
mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men,
acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule
of probable cause is a practical, non-technical conception affording the best
compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing
interests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow
less would be to leave law abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers'
whim or caprice.
Id. at 176.
184. United States v. Bozada, No. 71-1727, 6 (8th Mr. July 17, 1972).
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
185. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 (1968)

